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This paper provides evidence that uncontested director elections provide informative polls of 
investor perceptions regarding board performance. We find that higher (lower) vote approval is 
associated with lower (higher) stock price reactions to subsequent announcements of 
management turnovers. In addition, firms with low vote approval are more likely to experience 
CEO turnover, greater board turnover, lower CEO compensation, fewer and better received 
acquisitions, and more and better received divestitures in the future. These findings hold after 
controlling for other variables reflecting or determining investor perceptions, suggesting that 




 Every year the vast majority of publicly traded firms’ shareholders vote to approve members 
of the board of directors in uncontested elections (i.e., elections not involving proxy fights or 
vote-no campaigns). The lack of contested elections, coupled with the widespread use of 
plurality voting rules, implies director nominees almost always prevail. Consequently, 
commentators claim that director elections are meaningless charades of shareholder democracy 
(Morgenson, 2006; Monks and Minow, 2004).1 We conjecture, however, that uncontested 
elections serve as meaningful polls reflecting investor perceptions of board performance. The 
objective of this study is to empirically test this conjecture. 
 We construct approval measures using director vote tallies for a sample of S&P 500 firms 
from 2000-2004, and find evidence consistent with these measures reflecting investor 
perceptions of board performance. In particular, we examine the relation between the approval 
measures and the stock price response to a change in the most focal member of the board, the 
CEO. We find that higher (lower) approval is associated with lower (higher) stock price 
reactions to subsequent announcements of management turnovers. We also show that the 
approval measures predict uncertain future events expected to be associated with board 
performance. Specifically, we find that firms with low board approval are associated with a 
higher likelihood of CEO turnover, greater board turnover, lower CEO compensation, fewer and 
better received acquisitions, and more and better received divestitures subsequent to the vote.  
 We also assess whether the approval measures are incrementally informative to traditional 
metrics of board performance, such as stock returns and return on assets. We conjecture that a 
vote tally, which in principle pertains solely to board performance, is less likely to be 
contaminated by sources of noise inherent to equity market and financial metrics, such as 
commodity price movements and other economic shocks that are independent of management 
                                                 
1  Under plurality voting rules, the director nominee who receives the greatest number of affirmative votes is elected 
to fill an open board seat (i.e., a majority vote is not required). Consequently, when a slate of nominees put 
forward by the board runs unopposed, each nominee can be elected with a single affirmative vote. 
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decisions. Consistent with our conjecture, the information content in the vote approval measures 
is largely unaffected by the inclusion of controls for traditional metrics of board performance. 
Hence, the vote approval metrics are uniquely meaningful measures of board performance.  
 This study contributes to the existing literature by showing that uncontested votes reflect 
investor perceptions of board performance, despite a number of reasons suggesting otherwise. 
First, shareholders do not always vote diligently, either because the outcome is preordained or 
because their vote has an immaterial impact on the outcome (Downs, 1957). For example, 
shareholders owning “street name” shares (i.e., shares held by a broker) often do not provide the 
broker with voting instructions, which permits the broker to vote the shares.2 Also, some 
investors are alleged to follow the “Wall Street rule,” whereby they vote in favor of the slate 
proposed by the board, and only vote against the board by selling their shares (Lowenstein, 1988; 
Parrino, Sias, and Starks, 2002). Second, even if some shareholders do vote diligently, the votes 
they cast could be too few in number for their perceptions to be detectible. Finally, because only 
shareholders of record can vote, the votes of shareholders who do vote diligently do not 
necessarily reflect broader investor perceptions (Fischer, 2007). Our findings suggest 
uncontested votes do reflect investor perceptions in spite of these countervailing forces. 
 The results of our analyses should also be useful to researchers, regulators, and governance 
commentators. For instance, our approval measure can be used to complement existing 
governance measures, such as the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index, which focus 
primarily on governance structures (e.g., existence of classified board or board size) as opposed 
to the performance of the individuals operating within those structures. Further, the findings 
inform regulators and governance commentators debating recent calls to strengthen shareholder 
democracy (see Bebchuk, 2007), such as proposals to require majority voting requirements. 
                                                 
2  Broker votes are allowed only for routine matters, which includes uncontested director elections. Typically, 
broker votes are cast in favor of the proposed slate. A primary rationale for allowing broker votes is that they help 
ensure that a quorum is reached, which is necessary for the vote to transpire. See Bethel and Gillan (2002). 
 3 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss related literature. 
Section 3 provides information related to the sample and descriptive statistics. Our primary 
results are reported in sections 4 and 5. Section 6 describes the results of the supplementary tests, 
and concluding comments are provided in section 7.  
2. Related Literature 
 Our study contributes to several streams of literature, starting with shareholder activism 
literature, which focuses on contested shareholder votes involving proxy fights and vote-no 
campaigns.3 Contested elections are rare because the dissatisfied investors who initiate them 
incur significant costs. We focus instead on uncontested elections because they allow us to assess 
whether the usual voting process elicits information regarding investor perceptions. Further, we 
examine the information conveyed by the vote tally itself, whereas the contested vote literature 
focuses primarily on the information conveyed by the existence of a contested vote.4  
 Another stream of literature assesses whether institutional investors vote with their feet. 
Parrino et al. (2002) find that in periods prior to forced turnovers, institutional investors vote 
against management by selling their holdings. We complement their findings by providing 
evidence that similar investor perceptions are reflected in the vote tallies. That is, in addition to 
the Parrino et al. finding that institutional investors vote with their feet, we find that some 
investors express their preferences via the vote. 
 Our study also relates to the management performance and governance literatures. We 
contribute to the literature on non-financial management performance measures by providing a 
metric of board member performance that is relatively uncontaminated by exogenous sources of 
                                                 
3  Examples of research on proxy fights include Dodd and Warner (1983), DeAngelo (1988), Pound (1988), Collins 
and DeAngelo (1990), Denis and Denis (1995), and Mulherin and Poulsen (1998). A concurrent paper by Del 
Guercio et al. (2008) investigates vote-no campaigns. Studies of other forms of shareholder activism include 
Smith (1996) and Carleton, Nelson, and Weisbach (1998).  
4  A concurrent paper, Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009), also studies shareholder votes for directorships using a 
sample of both contested and uncontested ISS director voting data from 2003-2005. Cai et al. examine firm- and 
director-level variables associated with the election vote whereas our study attempts to validate the use of the vote 
to proxy as a summary measure of investor perceptions. Also, in supplementary analyses, we decompose the 
approval measure into numerator and denominator effects in order to better understand the factors driving the 
approval measure’s information content. 
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noise afflicting stock returns and financial measures of performance.5 The approval measure also 
can be used to complement existing governance measures that focus primarily on governance 
structures as opposed to the performance of the individuals operating within those structures.6  
 In addition, our work links to the broad CEO turnover literature, which generally seeks to 
identify factors that determine or predict CEO turnover.7 We use a CEO turnover prediction 
model to test the joint hypothesis that the vote reflects investor perceptions of the board’s 
performance, and that those perceptions are associated with CEO retention. Thus, CEO turnover 
prediction is not the primary aim.  
3. Sample and descriptive statistics 
3.1. Sample selection 
 Our sample consists of the Standard & Poor's 500 list at January 1, 2000, representing 2,500 
potential firm-year observations across the five years ending December 31, 2004. Because 
institutional investment policies often mandate holdings of S&P 500 firms (e.g., an S&P 500 
index fund), S&P 500 firms are more likely than non-S&P 500 firms to be heavily owned by 
investors who are unable to vote with their feet. Therefore, the vote results for S&P 500 firms 
should be more reflective of broader investor perceptions.  
 We hand-collect more than 10,000 individual director votes over the period 2000 to 2003, 
and collect an additional 2,250 individual director votes from the Institutional Shareholder 
Voting Analytics (ISVA) database for 2004.8 Voting outcomes are obtained from Item 4 of the 
                                                 
5  See Ittner and Larcker (2001) for a summary of non-financial performance measure literature in several contexts. 
6 Note that successful governance is highly contingent on management’s stewardship, regardless of the structures in 
place. For example, a board with a large percentage of insiders is typically thought to have ‘bad’ governance; 
however, the performance of the firm actually rests with how well the board operates the firm, not the degree to 
which some of the board members are insiders. Examples of studies that use structural indicators of governance 
include Shivdasani (1993), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Klein (2002), Andersen, Mansi, and Reeb. 
(2004), Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, and LaFond. (2006), and Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna (2007). 
7  See, for example, Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), Morck, Schleifer, and Vishny (1989), Parrino (1997), 
DeFond and Park (1999), Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001), Goyal and Park (2002), Engel, Hayes, and Wang 
(2003), Farrell and Whidbee (2003) and Balsam and Miharjo (2007). 
8 The ISVA database started in 2003 and covers the Russell 3000 company meetings. However, we had already 
hand-collected this data before the database was available. To ensure there were no material differences between 
the hand-collected sample and the ISVA data, we correlated the data for the overlapping period, i.e., 2003, and 
found approximately 99% correlation. 
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first 10-Q filing reported on the SEC's EDGAR database after the annual meeting. Not all firms 
disclose detailed voting outcomes, however, which limits the size of our potential sample. 
Further, when a firm ceases to exist during the 2000 to 2004 period, our data set includes only 
the votes up until the firm’s termination, causing survivorship bias because we do not replace 
firms ceasing to exist. Hence, the generality of our findings could be limited. 
 As described in Table 1, after eliminating firms in the utility sector, firms missing board 
approval data, and observations with missing data on CRSP, Compustat, or Thomson Financial, 
the sample consists of 1,564 annual board elections. Next we eliminate votes associated with 
contested elections, which are defined as votes occurring during a vote-no campaign or a proxy 
fight. Del Guercio et al. (2008) provide us with a list of the vote-no campaigns for the years 2000 
to 2003. Their sample involved searches of Lexis-Nexis, Factiva, The Wall Street Journal Index, 
and issues of the IRRC Corporate Governance Bulletin. We use the same keyword searches to 
replicate their search process for 2004, although we search EBSCO and Factiva, which parallel 
the data sources they search. Further, we search the IRRC Corporate Governance Bulletin and 
Google in an effort to identify all cases where there was a concerted effort to convince other 
investors to vote against specific directors.9 To identify proxy contests during the 2000 to 2004 
period, we search the Proxy Contests and other Major Activist Events section of the yearly 
Georgeson Shareholder Annual Meeting Season Wrap-Up Report.  
 Finally, we eliminate 15 observations related to firms having dual-class shares with each 
class selecting a subset of directors. These observations are eliminated because the vote 
outcomes cannot be summarized with our board approval measure. Together, these restrictions 
result in a sample of 1,497 annual election observations with available data for the board 
approval analyses, and a sample of 827 observations for the CEO approval analyses. 
 
                                                 
9  Consistent with Del Guercio et al. (2008), we do not classify elections as vote-no campaigns when institutional 
investors, such as CalPERS or ISS, merely mention that they intend to vote against a specific board member. 
Excluding such elections would eliminate nearly all of the firms in our sample, as in the 2004 proxy season when 
“CalPERS recommended that shareholders withhold votes for directors at 2,700 companies, or 90% of the firms 
that CalPERS invests in” (Iwata, 2004). 
 6 
3.2. Approval measures 
 Under the current corporate electoral system, shareholders cannot directly cast a ‘no’ vote on 
director nominees. Rather, SEC Rule 14a-4(b) requires a company to provide shareholders with 
the option to cast their share votes to either support or withhold support for a director nominee. 
Our objective is to use the uncontested vote tallies to derive a summary statistic of board 
performance for each firm in each year. Using the election results disclosed to investors in the 
10-Q filing after the annual meeting, we compute the percentage of affirmative votes for each 
director nominee:  
  
votes for
votes for + votes withheld  
where the denominator equals the total votes cast. 
 The primary summary approval measure used for our analysis, board approval (BRD_APPR), 
is the median percentage of affirmative votes for each slate of nominees. We use the median, as 
opposed to the mean, to avoid capturing shareholder dissatisfaction with a specific board 
member for a matter unrelated to overall board performance. We conjecture BRD_APPR reflects 
investor perceptions of board performance based on the assumption that shareholder 
dissatisfaction with the board is manifested in more withheld votes. This conjecture is supported 
by the observation that some active investors withhold their votes from the entire slate of 
directors when they are dissatisfied with current management. For instance, CalSTRS’s investor 
protector standards include the following summary of their voting practices: “Votes may be 
withheld [for the entire slate] when it appears that the existing board has been remiss in the 
performance of its oversight responsibilities” (CalSTRS, 2003). 
 We note that BRD_APPR is impacted by vote turnout indirectly because the denominator is 
the number of votes cast. If turnout varies significantly with investor perceptions, turnout could 
alter the informativeness of the approval statistic. Although this issue is directly addressed later 
in the paper, at this point it is worth noting that the percentage of outstanding shares voted (i.e., 
turnout) is, on average, quite high within our sample, with a mean of 87% (median of 87%). The 
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high turnout is partially attributable to institutional shareholders who are required to vote to 
satisfy their fiduciary responsibilities and who comprise a large segment of S&P 500 
shareholders.10 The high turnout also can be partially attributed to broker votes, which are votes 
made by brokers of ‘street name’ shares when the beneficial owners have not conveyed their 
voting preferences.  
 We also consider a more focused measure of approval, CEO approval (CEO_APPR), which 
is the percentage of affirmative votes for the CEO when the CEO is on the slate of nominees in a 
given year. CEO_APPR is not available each year due to staggered elections of board members, 
which substantially reduces the number of available CEO_APPR observations. If an individual 
director’s vote tally reflects investor perceptions of only that director, we expect tests using 
CEO_APPR and BRD_APPR to yield different results. Similar results, however, would validate 
the use of the BRD_APPR statistic as a relevant performance metric for the management team.  
 
3.3. Descriptive data  
 Panels A and B of Table 2 summarize the distributions of BRD_APPR and CEO_APPR by 
year and across the entire sample period. The vast majority of APPR values exceed 95% and 
nearly all are in the range between 85% and 100%. This suggests that a seemingly favorable 
rating, say 80%, is less favorable when taken in the context of typical approval ratings. 
 Table 2 also suggests that mean and median values of approval have declined since 2000. 
This reduction in approval could be attributed to a greater sense of shareholder activism and/or 
general investor disgruntlement due to the declining stock market and corporate scandals. 
Regardless of the cause, an approval rating of 85% in the later years could reflect investor 
perceptions a bit differently than a rating of 85% in the earlier years. To control for year effects, 
we include year fixed effects when continuous measures of board and CEO approval are 
employed. Additionally, we create annual quintiles for board approval (i.e., 
                                                 
10  Based on Thompson Financial 13(f) institutional shareholder data, institutions held, on average, 68% (median 
70%) of the common shares of the firms in our sample. 
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QUINT_BRD_APPR) and CEO approval (i.e., QUINT_CEO_APPR). Employing an ordinal 
ranking also limits the impact of individual observations falling in the extreme lower tail of the 
skewed vote distribution. 
 Table 3 provides correlations of the various approval measures with each other as well as 
with other metrics reflecting board performance. The correlation between any board approval 
measure and the analogous CEO approval measure is about 80%. These positive correlations 
suggest common factors drive both board and CEO approval metrics, consistent with investors 
assessing the governing team as a whole. We also examine the correlations of various alternative 
director approval subgroups to validate our notion that the board is generally viewed as one large 
management team, as opposed to individuals, in terms of performance evaluation. In untabulated 
results, we find similarly high correlations between approval for a board member selected at 
random, approval for the second-lowest-rated director, approval for the fourth-lowest-rated 
director, mean (as opposed to median) director approval, and mean and median approval for non-
CEO board members. This strongly suggests that board members tend to receive similar approval 
ratings.  
 We next consider correlations between the approval measures and other metrics reflecting 
board performance: industry-adjusted return on assets, industry-adjusted stock returns, and 
changes in institutional ownership. We expect the approval measures to be positively related to 
industry-adjusted stock returns and industry-adjusted return on assets leading up to the vote, 
since board performance is linked to firm performance. We do not have a directional prediction 
regarding the relation between the change in institutional ownership and the approval measures. 
On one hand, we expect a positive relation if institutional investor satisfaction is shared by 
investors holding shares at the vote date; that is, institutions decrease (increase) holdings as other 
shareholders in the firm vote more negatively (positively). On the other hand, we expect a 
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negative relation if institutional investor satisfaction is not shared with the non-institutional 
investors. Thus, it remains an empirical question whether the votes made by investors who vote 
their shares concur with the votes made by institutional investors who vote with their feet. 
 The time horizon over which performance assessments are made by investors is unclear, so 
we consider industry-adjusted stock returns and return on assets for a firm over three years.11 
That is, we calculate RETt, RETt-1, and RETt-2 as the industry-adjusted 12-month return for each 
of the three years immediately preceding the annual meeting when the vote takes place. We use 
industry-adjusted returns as opposed to market-adjusted returns, because industry-adjusted 
returns eliminate both market-wide and industry-wide shocks that are beyond the control of the 
board. Similarly, we calculate ROAt, ROAt-1 and ROAt-2 as the four-quarter industry-adjusted 
return on assets for each of the three years immediately preceding the annual meeting when the 
shareholder vote takes place. The inclusion of the performance variables for each year in the 
regressions controls for trends and/or changes in firm performance across those years as well.12 
We industry-adjust the RET and ROA values by subtracting median industry values based on the 
Fama and French (1997) 48 industry sectors.  
 Table 3 indicates a significant positive association between our approval measures and the 
various returns on assets and stock returns, which is consistent with the approval measures 
reflecting perceptions of board performance. These correlations are consistent with previous 
studies of contested election tallies, which find similar relations using votes cast for various 
shareholder proposals (Gillan and Starks, 2000; Ferri, Markarian, and Sandino, 2004; and Ferri, 
Ertimur, and Stubben, 2008) and votes cast during vote-no campaigns (Del Guercio et al., 2008). 
Our analysis adds to this research by providing broader cross-sectional representation and by 
                                                 
11  In the CEO turnover literature, Warner et al. (1988) use up to three-year stock return horizons as the relevant 
performance measure while Huson et al. (2001) employ both two-year return and one-year ROA horizons and 
Engel et al. (2003) employ one-year return and ROA horizons.  
12 We also run all the analyses in the paper using changes in ROA for the previous 3 years and the results are 
unaffected. 
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considering votes in which no outside parties actively promote a position, as in the case of 
shareholder proposals and vote-no campaigns.  
 CHG_INST_OWN is the change in institutional holdings over the four quarters ending 
immediately preceding the annual meeting. We determine the number of outstanding shares 
owned by 13(f) institutions as a percentage of the total number of shares outstanding as reported 
for the same quarter by Compustat, after adjusting for stock split differences. The correlations in 
Table 3 reveal no significant correlation between CHG_INST_OWN and any of the approval 
measures. 
4.  Stock price response to turnover announcements 
 Although the correlations identified in Table 3 suggest that vote tallies capture investor 
perceptions regarding board performance, these correlations could merely indicate that approval 
reflects shareholder perceptions of past stock price or financial performance, regardless of 
whether the performance is attributed to the board. Hence, we undertake additional analyses to 
link our approval measures with the capital market response to a salient event involving the 
board – CEO turnover. We focus on CEO turnover announcements, as opposed to board turnover 
announcements, because a CEO turnover typically represents a more substantive economic event 
with an identifiable announcement date. 
 The board plays a pivotal role in monitoring the managers of a public corporation, and 
removing a CEO is potentially the most important monitoring decision a board will make (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Huson et al., 2001). As a consequence, the presence of a poorly (well) 
perceived CEO is perceived as a failure (success) of the board, where the degree of failure 
(success) is associated with how poorly (well) the CEO is perceived to be performing. Assuming 
BRD_APPR reflects these perceptions, we expect investors to react more (less) favorably to the 
announcement of a CEO departure if BRD_APPR is relatively low (high). We also expect a 
similar relation between CEO_APPR and investor reactions to CEO departures. Note that if an 
individual board member vote tally relates only to the perceptions of that individual board 
member, only the expected relation for CEO_APPR will hold. 
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 We identify CEO turnovers using year-to-year changes within the CEO name variable of the 
ExecuComp database. We then search ProQuest and Google for press announcements to identify 
the initial turnover announcement date. Using this process, we identify 185 CEO turnovers in our 
sample occurring within the year subsequent to annual meetings where the votes are tallied. Of 
these 185 turnovers, we exclude 18 associated with concurrent merger announcements or 
missing data. Of the remaining turnovers, we have board approval for all 167 turnovers and CEO 
approval for 82 turnovers. 
 We measure the stock price response to the turnover announcement as the five-day (-3, +1) 
cumulative abnormal stock return (CAR) surrounding the CEO turnover announcement. We 
apply the market model to estimate firm-specific CARs using CRSP-population data based upon 
a 255-day period ending 46 days before the announcement date. Panel A of Table 4 presents 
regression results of five-day CEO turnover announcement CARs, CEO_CAR, on the four 
approval measures in the following univariate regression, referred to as the “Short Model”: 
  CEO_CARi,t+1 = β0 + β1*APPR i,t + εi,t , (1) 
where APPR is the relevant approval measure (i.e., QUINT_BRD_APPR, BRD_APPR 
QUINT_CEO_APPR, or CEO_APPR) for the vote outcome associated with the firm’s annual 
meeting most closely preceding the turnover announcement. If the approval measure reflects 
investor perceptions, we should observe a negative coefficient on the relevant approval measure. 
Panel A of Table 4 also reports regression results for a “Long Model” controlling for other 
readily accessible performance statistics available at the time of the vote, which prior research 
has shown to reflect management’s performance:13 
 CEO_CARi,t+1 = β0 + β1*APPRi,t + CONTROLSi+ εi,t, (2) 
                                                 
13  Warner et al. (1988) and Weisbach (1988) find an association between past (market-adjusted) stock returns and 
“top management changes.” More recent studies assessing turnover prediction also observe an association 
between past measures of financial performance, such as industry-adjusted ROA, and CEO turnover (see, for 
example, Huson et al., 2001 and Engel et al., 2003). Parrino et al. (2002) and Del Guercio et al. (2008) find a 
relationship between changes in institutional holdings and subsequent CEO turnover. 
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where CONTROLSi represents the incorporation of the following statistics into the regression: 
RETi,t, RETi,t-1, RETi,t-2, ROAi,t, ROAi,t-1, ROAi,t-2, and CHG_INST_OWNi,t. If the approval 
measures are not subsumed by the information contained in these other statistics, we expect to 
observe significantly negative coefficients on the approval measures. Following Froot (1989), we 
use Huber (1967) and White (1980) sandwich estimates of variances to adjust the standard errors 
for possible correlation in errors among observations involving the same firm (i.e., we cluster by 
firm) for both models and include year dummies when examining the continuous approval 
measures. Year dummies are not included if quintiled approval measures are used because 
creating quintiles within each year controls for year fixed effects. A similar approach is 
employed in subsequent analyses as well. 
 The results for the Short Models indicate that both QUINT_BRD_APPR and 
QUINT_CEO_APPR have the predicted sign and are statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
results for BRD_APPR are significant at the 1% level, while the results for CEO_APPR are 
significant at the 10% level. Moreover, the relationship between approval and the CEO departure 
return appears to be robust to the inclusion of alternative performance metrics.14  
 An implicit assumption in the framing and interpretation of tests summarized in Panel A of 
Table 4 is that investors’ expectations related to the fit (e.g., ability and/or strategic direction) of 
the incoming CEO are different from that of the incumbent. That is, the return at the turnover 
announcement date is a function not only of attributes regarding the departing CEO, but also of 
the attributes of the CEO who replaces, or is expected to replace, the departing CEO. Clearly, the 
replacement of a poorly perceived CEO with a “clone” would not warrant a positive market 
reaction because the replacement would not reflect a change from the status quo. In fact, it may 
even result in a negative reaction as investors become less hopeful for change. Similarly, the 
                                                 
14 To ensure that neither the low or high approval group is the sole driver of these results, we further examine the 
extreme approval quintiles to assess whether the expected association continues to hold for both. In untabulated 
results, we find that firms with the lowest approval receive significantly positive market reactions around CEO 
departure announcements and firms with the highest approval receive significantly negative market reactions 
around CEO departure announcements, which suggests that neither group individually drives the result. 
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departure of a well-regarded CEO warrants a negative reaction to the degree that if investors 
view the successor as a person who will change the favorable status quo.  
 Consistent with the above line of reasoning, Borokhovich, Parrino, and Tarpani (1996) find 
that returns around forced CEO turnover announcements are positive (negative) when an outsider 
(insider) replaces a CEO. The story underlying this finding is that an insider replacement is less 
likely to bring about a substantial change from the status quo associated with the predecessor 
CEO. That is, the insider/outsider partition is essentially a proxy for whether the successor is a 
change agent. If the vote approval metrics reflect investor satisfaction with the status quo, the 
findings in Borokhovich et al. (1996) lead us to predict that the stock price response to an insider 
replacement will be higher (lower) than that of an outsider replacement when the vote approval 
metric is higher (lower). 
 In order to test this prediction, we search Factiva and Google to determine whether the CEO 
replacement was an insider or outsider. Of the 167 CEO departure announcements in Panel A, 
116 named an insider replacement, 16 named an outsider, and 35 mentioned that a replacement 
search would be conducted and/or no indication was given as to the replacement. Almost 88% 
(i.e., 31/35) of those that do not mention a replacement at the departure announcement eventually 
hire an outsider. Since we are trying to capture the market’s expectation of change, we code this 
group as an outside replacement. Similar results are obtained when we assume a strong form of 
rational expectations by coding Insider as one if an insider ultimately replaces the CEO, and zero 
otherwise. 
  We modify equations (1) and (2) with the addition of a dummy variable INSIDER, which 
equals one if there is an insider replacement and zero otherwise, and an interactive term, 
APPR*INSIDER. If our prediction is correct, the approval measures should load negatively (as in 
Panel A), since this coefficient now represents the effect of approval given an outside 
replacement (i.e., our proxy for change). We expect a positive coefficient on the interactive term 
to indicate the effect is mitigated when there is an insider replacement because insiders are more 
likely to maintain the status quo.  
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 Panel B of Table 4 reports the results for the Short and Long Model augmented to include 
INSIDER and APPR*INSIDER. As in Panel A, the coefficients on the approval measures are 
negative, and statistically significant, with larger t-statistics, for three of the four measures. 
QUINT_BRD_APPR is still negative, but no longer statistically significant at conventional 
levels. With the exception of the regressions employing QUINT_BRD_APPR, the coefficients on 
APPR*INSIDER are positive and statistically significant at conventional levels in the Short 
Models. Furthermore, the coefficients on APPR*INSIDER have magnitudes similar to the APPR 
measures, indicating that the stock price reaction to a CEO departure announcement is largely 
mitigated when firms replace the CEO with a protégé. When other performance measures are 
incorporated, the statistical significance of the coefficients on APPR*INSIDER is generally 
diminished, although the signs are still positive. Overall, this combined evidence suggests that 
vote tallies reflect market perceptions of performance. In addition, the market response to a 
turnover is a function of both the perceptions of the departing CEO and the replacement CEO. 
5. Approval measures as predictors of future events 
 Beyond reflecting perceptions at a point in time, a more useful poll predicts the outcome of 
an uncertain future event. The next set of tests, which reflect this point of view, relate approval 
measures to significant future corporate events likely to be associated with perceptions of board 
performance. In particular, if the approval measures capture investor perceptions of board 
performance, we expect to find that lower vote approval will be associated with higher 
probability of forced CEO turnover, higher probability of outside replacement CEOs, and 
reductions in excess CEO compensation. We also expect that firms with lower vote approval will 
make fewer acquisitions in the future, and that the acquisitions that are made will garner more 
favorable perception in the marketplace. In a similar vein, we expect firms with lower vote 
approval will have both more and better-received divestitures. It is important to note that the tests 
of these hypothesized associations are not tests of whether the votes, or the perceptions reflected 
in the votes, directly cause the actions to occur. Instead, they are merely joint tests of whether 
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perceptions of performance are reflected in the vote, and whether these perceptions are 
associated with subsequent events of interest.  
5.1. CEO turnover 
 The CEO turnover literature conjectures a poorly performing CEO is more likely to be forced 
out, and the findings in that literature relating measures of performance (i.e., stock price, 
financial, and change in institutional ownership) to turnover are consistent with this conjecture. 
(e.g., Warner et al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988; Parrino et al., 2002.) If the approval measures 
constructed from the vote tallies reflect perceptions of management performance, we also expect 
low approval measures to be associated with a greater probability of forced CEO turnover. 
Further, if the noise in the approval measures differs from the noise in the other performance 
measures, we expect the approval measures to have predictive value even after controlling for 
the other measures. 
 To test whether a CEO is more likely to be forced out when vote tallies are less favorable, we 
identify all CEO turnovers within the sample of firms and then use the methodology employed 
by Parrino (1997) to identify just the forced turnovers. We classify a turnover as forced if there is 
a news article or press release in the ProQuest database stating the CEO was fired, forced out, or 
departed due to unspecified policy differences. Turnovers not classified as forced by the previous 
criteria are still classified as forced if the CEO was under age 60 at the most recent shareholder 
meeting, and either (1) there is no article attributing the CEO departure to death, health concerns, 
or the CEO accepting a different position within the firm or with another firm, or (2) an article 
reported an announcement of the CEO’s retirement plans and the announcement is not at least 
six months prior to the effective date of the retirement. For turnovers classified as forced because 
criterion (2) is satisfied, we further investigate whether (a) the CEO took a comparable position 
elsewhere or (b) subsequent articles identified a personal or business reason for the departure not 
relating to activities at the firm in question. If either (a) or (b) is satisfied, the turnover is 
reclassified as unforced. Employing this classification process, our sample contains 55 forced 
turnovers. For the subsample where CEO_APPR is available, there are 30 forced turnovers.  
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 In order to test the joint hypothesis that low vote approval is positively associated with forced 
CEO turnovers, we run the following logit regression, which predicts the probability of a forced 
CEO turnover: 
  CEO_TURNi,t+1 = β0 + β1*APPRi,t + β2 *AGEi,t + CONTROLSi + εi,t ,  (3) 
where CEO_TURNi,t equals 0 if no forced turnover for firm i occurs (i.e., there is no turnover or 
an unforced turnover) in the period from the annual meeting at date t up to and including the next 
annual meeting date and equals 1 if a forced turnover occurs within the window; APPR is the 
relevant approval measure, i.e., QUINT_BRD_APPR, BRD_APPR, BQ1, QUINT_CEO_APPR, 
CEO_APPR, or CQ1, where BQ1 (CQ1) is an indicator variable that equals one if the board 
(CEO) approval is in the bottom quintile, and zero otherwise; AGE is the age of the CEO on the 
annual meeting date, which is obtained from The Corporate Library Governance database if 
available and the Hoover’s database otherwise; and CONTROLS reflects the inclusion of other 
measures reflecting performance, i.e., RETt, RETt-1, RETt-2, ROAt, ROAt-1, ROAt-2, and 
CHG_INST_OWNt.  
 Panel A of Table 5 reports results consistent with the hypothesized association. Regardless of 
the approval measure used, the estimated sign is in the predicted direction at the 1% level, with 
the exception of QUINT_BRD_APPR and CQ1, which are both significant at the 5% level. To 
provide some perspective regarding the economic magnitude of these findings, consider, for 
example, the regression involving the approval measure QUINT_BRD_APPR. Assuming all the 
variables with the exception of QUINT_BRD_APPR are set to their mean values, the estimated 
probability of a forced CEO turnover for BRD_APPR measures in the first (i.e., lowest) to fifth 
(i.e., highest) quintiles are 5.1%, 4.0%, 3.1%, 2.4%, and 1.9%, respectively.15 Although the 
probability of forced turnover is relatively small across all quintiles, the percentage change in 
probabilities across quintiles is substantial. For example, a CEO in the lowest quintile of 
                                                 
15 The probability of a forced turnover in the logit model is 1/(1 + exp[– β0 – β1*QUINT_BRD_APPR – β2*AGE – 
CONTROLS]). 
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BRD_APPR is more than two and one-half times as likely to suffer a forced turnover than a CEO 
in the highest quintile.  
5.2. CEO turnover with outside replacement 
 Our finding that a CEO is more likely to be forced out when approval measures are lower is 
consistent with a forced turnover leading to a change in an unfavorably viewed status quo. The 
replacement of a CEO with his protégé, however, would most likely lower the probability of 
change in the status quo. Hence, in Panel B of Table 5 we consider an event that is even more 
likely to suggest a change—a forced turnover coupled with an outsider replacement. Similar to 
Panel A, we find that the probability of a forced turnover replaced with an outsider is more likely 
when there is low approval. Regardless of the approval measure used, the estimated sign is in the 
predicted direction at the 1% level, with the exception of QUINT_CEO_APPR, which is 
significant at the 5% level.  
 For perspective, we again evaluate the probability of a forced turnover where an outsider 
replaces the CEO using the mean values for the other variables previously provided. The 
resulting probabilities of forced outside replacement in the first (i.e., lowest) to fifth (i.e., 
highest) quintiles of board approval are 3.1%, 2.0%, 1.3%, 0.9%, and 0.6%, respectively. Similar 
to the case of forced turnover, the probability of forced turnover with outside replacement is 
relatively small across all quintiles, but the percentage change in probabilities across quintiles is 
substantial. For example, a CEO in the lowest quintile of BRD_APPR is more than five times as 
likely to suffer a forced turnover with outside replacement than a CEO in the highest quintile.  
 In untabulated results, we find a similar negative relationship between approval and the 
likelihood of a forced CEO turnover when an insider replaces the CEO, but none of the approval 
measures are significant at conventional levels. Overall, these findings suggest that lower 
shareholder approval is associated with higher likelihood of outsider, as opposed to insider, 
replacement after a CEO is forced out. 
5.3. Board turnover 
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 In addition to removing the CEO, the management team can be altered by removing and/or 
replacing directors. To identify director turnover, we use data from the IRRC Director Database 
and The Corporate Library. We calculate board turnover, BRD_TURN, as the change in the 
number of board members divided by the number of board seats up for election. We have scaled 
the change in the number of board members by the board seats up for election because, a priori, 
we believe that individuals are unlikely to resign prior to the completion of their term due to the 
psychic or reputation costs associated with an early departure.  
 We run the following OLS regression to test the relation between vote approval and board 
turnover: 
  BRD_TURNi,t+1 = β0 + β1*APPRi,t + CONTROLSi, + εi,t ,  (4) 
where BRD_TURNt+1 is the board turnover for the period from the annual meeting at date t up to 
and including the next annual meeting date, APPR is the relevant measure of approval, and 
CONTROLS are other measures of performance based upon stock returns, return on assets, or 
changes in institutional ownership. We expect a negative relationship between board approval 
and board turnover. The results for the full sample of firms where director turnover is available 
are reported in the first three columns of Table 6. The coefficients on all approval measures are 
statistically significant at the 5% or better level in the predicted direction, indicating that higher 
(lower) board approval is associated with lower (higher) board turnover in the following year. 
 Findings in Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) suggest the introduction of a new outside CEO is 
likely to be associated with broader board shake-ups. To ascertain whether CEO turnovers with 
outside replacements drive the board turnover results reported in Table 6, we eliminate all 
observations with outside CEO successions from our sample. The results are reported in columns 
4-6 of Table 6 and appear robust to this exclusion.16 These findings suggest board shake-ups 
                                                 
16 In untabulated results, we also eliminate all CEO turnovers to determine whether board turnover is associated 
with CEO turnover in general. The results are qualitatively similar to those reported in columns 4-6 and still 
significant at conventional levels, albeit slightly weaker. 
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occur when perceptions of board performance are unfavorable, independent of whether an 
outsider replaces the CEO.  
5.4. CEO compensation 
 In addition to changes in management structure, we hypothesize vote approval is positively 
associated with a CEO’s future compensation. We expect this association for two non-mutually 
exclusive reasons. First, CEO compensation has been associated with past performance in prior 
literature, which suggests it should be associated with vote approval if vote approval more 
broadly reflects management performance (see, for example, Murphy, 1985; Lambert and 
Larcker, 1987). Second, prior literature regarding press coverage and board decisions has 
suggested boards could respond to perceptions of their performance in negotiating executive 
compensation (Core, Guay, and Larcker, 2008).17  
 We compute an excess compensation metric and then assess whether subsequent excess CEO 
compensation is positively related to the approval measure.18 Note the term “excess” need not 
imply compensation is suboptimal. Excess compensation is the residual from a compensation 
model incorporating various economic determinants of compensation (i.e., performance metrics, 
firm size, and CEO tenure). The residual could be due to suboptimal compensation decisions 
and/or omitted performance metrics in the model. 
 The excess compensation metric is derived following the approach employed by Core, Guay, 
and Larcker (2008). Accordingly, we use the following model to estimate expected 
compensation: 
                                                 
17 Other studies have considered how perceptions of board performance in the press might influence governance 
decisions. For example, Louis, Joe, and Robinson (2009) find boards identified as ineffective in the media 
increase the number of outside directors and discontinue the use of staggered boards. 
18 We use CEO compensation for the first full fiscal year after the annual meeting, as opposed to compensation in 
the year of the annual meeting, because the compensation in the year of the meeting is likely to have been 
established before the meeting date. That is, the annual meeting date for fiscal period t is in fiscal period t+1. 
Given that the meeting is generally several months into period t+1, the compensation contract for period t+1 is 
most likely established by the meeting date. Therefore, the board will react to a vote related to period t by 
adjusting the compensation contract in the next available period, which is period t+2.  
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log(Compi,t) = β0 + β1*log(tenure)i,t + β2*log(sales)i,t-1 + β3*BTMi,t-1 + β4*Returni,t + β5*Returni,t-1 
+ β6*ReturnOnAssetsi,t + β7*ReturnOnAssetsi,t-1 + εi,t ,   (5) 
where log(Compt) is defined as the logarithm of total compensation (calculated as the sum of 
salary, bonus, long-term incentive plan payouts, the value of restricted stock grants, the value of 
options granted during the year, and any other annual pay for the CEO in year t). Log(tenure)t is 
the logarithm of the CEO’s tenure in years at the end of year t. Log(sales)t-1 is the logarithm of 
firm sales for year t-1. BTMt-1 is the book value of assets / (book value of liabilities + market 
value of equity) at the end of year t-1. Returnt is the firm’s return for year t. Returnt-1 is the firm’s 
return for year t-1. ReturnOnAssetst is income before extraordinary items divided by average 
total assets for year t. ReturnOnAssetst-1 is income before extraordinary items divided by average 
total assets for year t-1. Equation (6) is estimated using OLS, where fixed effects for industry (2-
digit SIC) and year are included. We calculate expected compensation by exponentiating the 
expected value from equation (6). We then obtain our proxy for excess compensation for each 
observation by subtracting expected compensation from total compensation; that is, Total 
Compensation minus Expected Compensation equals Excess Compensation. 
 To capture the association between approval and subsequent excess compensation, we 
estimate the following model using OLS: 
  ExcessCompi,t+2 = β0 + β1*APPRi,t + β2*CONTRACTi,t  
                                     + β3*CONTRACTi,t*APPRi,t + CONTROLSi + εi,t,   (6) 
where ExcessCompt+2 is excess CEO compensation for the first full fiscal year after the annual 
meeting, APPR is the relevant measure of approval, CONTRACT is a dummy variable, which is 1 
if the CEO has a written employment agreement in place, and CONTROLS are other measures of 
performance as previously discussed. The inclusion of the CONTRACT variable is based on 
recent research by Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino (2009) demonstrating that CEOs at nearly 50% 
of S&P 500 firms have written (explicit) employment agreements that stipulate compensation 
over a period of time and thus limit the sensitivity of compensation to perceptions of 
performance. Thus, we predict that the interactive term will have a coefficient with a sign 
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opposite to the sign of the APPR coefficient. We obtain the contract data from Gillan et al. 
(2009) who classify the existence of CEO contracts as of January 1, 2000. Finally, we delete 
observations with CEO turnovers in the following two fiscal years after the annual meeting date 
in order to ensure the same CEO is employed both at the annual meeting date for fiscal period t 
through fiscal year t+2.  
 The results of the excess compensation analysis are reported in Table 7. The relations 
between the approval metrics and subsequent excess compensation are in the predicted directions 
for all approval variables and are statistically significant for all approval variables except 
BRD_APPR. Overall, these findings are consistent with approval having a positive association 
with future compensation. In addition, there is some, albeit quite weak, evidence of explicit 
employment contracts mitigating this association. More specifically, all CEO approval 
interaction coefficient estimates are in the predicted direction, but only the CEO_APPR 
interaction loads significantly (at the 10% level). 
5.5. Acquisitions 
 We hypothesize that poorly perceived boards are associated with better-received acquisitions 
and fewer acquisitions in the future. There are two potential reasons, which are not mutually 
exclusive. First, external financiers and/or board members are likely to be less willing to accept, 
and more diligent in their scrutiny of, proposed acquisitions when the board is perceived to be 
managing poorly, limiting cash flow available for proposed acquisitions and/or improving 
acquisition decisions. External financiers are more likely to exhibit such behavior because they 
are not confident in management’s ability to identify and negotiate a sound acquisition. Some 
board members, particularly external board members, are likely to exhibit such behavior because 
they are less trusting of the judgment and capabilities of the CEO’s management team, they are 
distancing themselves from a poorly perceived management team, and/or they are acting to 
enhance or revive their own reputation by helping the firm make better decisions. Second, firms 
with poorly perceived board performance are likely to have poorer cash positions, thereby 
reducing the cash available for investment decisions.  
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 To test whether low approval is associated with better-received future acquisitions and fewer 
future acquisitions, we collect a list of mergers and acquisitions for foreign and domestic targets 
from SDC’s U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions Database. We follow prior literature (e.g., Fuller, 
Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002) and eliminate acquisitions where the dollar value of the target 
firm is not disclosed, the deal value is less than one million dollars, or the bidder is acquiring less 
than 50% of the target firm. We also eliminate joint ventures and mergers announced by the 
same firm within a five-day trading window.  
 We calculate the market response to the acquisition announcement, ACQ_CAR, as the 
average five-day market model cumulative abnormal return estimated using CRSP-population 
data from a 255-day estimation period ending 46 days before the acquisition announcement. 
ACQ_CAR is determined for all acquisition announcement dates taking place in the 12 months 
subsequent to the annual meeting. Columns 1-3 of Table 8 report the regression results for the 
following model: 
 ACQ_CARi,t+1 = β0 + β1*APPRi,t + CONTROLSi + εi,t,  (7) 
 Consistent with our hypothesis, there is a negative relationship between board approval and 
the average subsequent acquisition announcement market return. QUINT_BRD_APPR, 
BRD_APPR, and BQ1 have the predicted signs and are statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
 To assess whether subsequent acquisition frequency decreases for firms with low votes, we 
define ACQ_FREQ as the number of acquisitions that take place in the 12 months subsequent to 
the annual meeting. Columns 4-6 of Table 8 report the ordered logistic regression results for the 
following model. 
 ACQ_FREQi,t+1 = β0 + β1*APPRi,t + CONTROLSi + εi,t,  (8) 
 Consistent with our hypothesis, we find a positive (negative) coefficient on 
QUINT_BRD_APPR (BQ1), significant at the 5% level. The coefficient on BRD_APPR is 
positive as predicted, but insignificant at conventional levels. Overall, these combined results 
indicate an inverse relationship between performance and subsequent acquisition activity.  
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5.6. Divestitures 
 When management is performing poorly, a firm’s assets are likely to be underperforming to a 
greater extent so the returns on divestitures of assets should be higher. In addition, when 
management is performing poorly, there should be more divestitures because there are more 
valuable divesture opportunities, as well as a greater demand for divestiture cash flows to 
counter poor operating cash flows. As a consequence, we hypothesize that low approval, which 
reflects perceptions of poor management, will be associated with better-received divestitures and 
more divestiture activity. 
 To test these hypotheses, we collect a list of U.S. divestitures from Securities Data 
Corporation (SDC). We eliminate divestitures where the dollar value of the divested firm is not 
disclosed, the deal value is less than one million dollars, or divestitures for the same firm are 
announced within a five-day trading window. To examine the market response to the divestiture 
activity following the vote, we calculate DIV_CAR as the average five-day market model 
cumulative abnormal return estimated using CRSP-population data from a 255-day estimation 
period ending 46 days before the divestiture announcement for all divestiture announcement 
dates that took place in the 12 months subsequent to the annual meeting.  
 Columns 1-3 of Table 9 report the OLS regression results for the following model: 
DIV_CARi,t+1 = β0 + β1*APPRi,t + CONTROLSi, + εi,t .         (9) 
Consistent with our expectations, there is a negative relationship between board approval and the 
average subsequent divestiture market return. QUINT_BRD_APPR, BRD_APPR, and BQ1 all 
have the predicted signs and are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
 To test whether subsequent divestiture activity increases for firms with low votes, we define 
DIV_FREQ as the number of divestitures taking place in the 12 months subsequent to the annual 
meeting and run the following ordered logistic regression model:  
 DIV_FREQi,t+1 = β0 + β1*APPRi,t + CONTROLSi + εi,t .  (10) 
 The results obtained from the regression model are reported in Columns 4-6 of Table 9, and 
are consistent with our prediction. Specifically, the coefficients on QUINT_BRD_APPR and BQ1 
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are statistically significant at the 5% level in the predicted directions. The coefficient on 
BRD_APPR has the predicted sign, although it is only significant at the 10% level. Overall, the 
combined results in Table 9 suggest that lower approval is associated with better-received 
subsequent divestitures as well as an increase in the number of subsequent divestitures. 
6. Supplementary analysis 
6.1. Change in voting behavior 
 This paper examines whether measures of investor perceptions of boards are associated with 
retention and investment decisions. A natural follow-up analysis ascertains whether subsequent 
changes in perceptions are associated with these decisions. Hence, we estimate the change in 
perceptions as a function of the average five-day CAR around the events: 
  CHG_BRD_APPRi,t = β0 + β1* EVENT_CARi,t + εi,t ,  (11) 
where EVENT_CAR represents CARs surrounding the event announcement: CEO turnovers 
(CEO_CAR), acquisitions (ACQ_CAR), or divestitures (DIV_CAR). A positive coefficient on 
EVENT_CAR indicates that an event viewed favorably (poorly) by the market is associated with 
a positive (negative) change in board approval. In untabulated results, we find that only 
CEO_CAR is significantly positive (p-value = 0.034), indicating that adjustments in acquisition 
and divestiture activity for the year do not have a significant effect on perceptions. One potential 
reason for this result is that perceptions are difficult to change with investment decisions and can 
only be altered by an action as drastic as replacing the leader of the current management team. 
6.2. Decomposing the approval measures 
 The approval measure used in our primary analyses is a function of how shareholders choose 
to exercise their voting rights. It is not immediately clear, however, which voting choice drives 
the information content of the approval measure. In particular, a shareholder faces three 
alternatives related to voting proxies in director elections: vote for the board member 
(affirmation), withhold vote for the board member (rejection), or not vote at all (apathy). The 
numerator of our summary approval measure (votes for) reflects the number of shareholders who 
chose to affirm a director, or who are apathetic but whose broker votes their street share to affirm 
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a director. The denominator (votes cast) reflects the number of shareholders who choose not to 
be apathetic, or whose broker votes their street share in the event they are apathetic. Hence, the 
approval measures are a function of both voter turnout and how the votes are cast.  
 To better understand the information content of each component, we decompose each 
approval measure into two statistics, affirmation and apathy, where affirmation is defined as: 
votes for / votes outstanding and apathy is defined as: votes outstanding / (votes for + votes 
withheld). We obtain the number of votes outstanding from proxy filings made prior to the 
annual meeting. We then revisit the turnover announcement tests and run the following 
regression: 
CEO_CARi,t+1 = β0 + β1*AFFIRMi,t + β2*APATHYi,t + CONTROLSi+ εi,t.          (12) 
Consistent with the results in Table 4, we expect the AFFIRM measures to be negatively related 
to the announcement period returns (i.e., β1 < 0). However, we offer no explicit prediction for the 
controlled relationship between APATHY and announcement period returns. In untabulated 
results, we find that both the quintiled and continuous measures of board affirmation are negative 
and significant at the 5% level. In contrast, the corresponding apathy measures are insignificant 
at conventional levels. The results using decomposed CEO approval measures are qualitatively 
similar, though less significant.  
 We also revisit the forced CEO turnover prediction models by running logit regressions of 
the following form: 
CEO_TURNi,t+1 = β0 + β1*AFFIRMi,t + β2*APATHYi,t + β3 *AGEi,t + CONTROLSi,+ εi,t .  (13) 
Consistent with the results in Table 5, we expect the AFFIRM measures to be negatively related 
to forced CEO turnover (i.e., β1 < 0). Again, we have no explicit prediction on how APATHY 
should be related to forced CEO turnover. In untabulated results, the board and CEO affirmation 
measures have the expected negative association with forced CEO turnovers. However, in 
contrast to results from equation 12, the coefficients on the continuous measure of board apathy 
and both the quintiled and continuous measures of CEO apathy are negative and statistically 
significant.  
 26 
 Overall, this evidence suggests that the information content of the board and CEO approval 
measures is driven primarily by the decisions of voting shareholders – to affirm or withhold. 
Shareholder apathy, or equivalently turnout, fails to add substantially to the affirmation statistic 
in terms of shareholder perceptions. Shareholder apathy, however, appears to play a role in 
predicting turnover, consistent with apathy reflecting shareholder ‘voting’ activism.  
6.3. Approval as a proxy for governance 
 Although we view the vote tallies as a measure of board performance, an alternative view is 
that vote tallies simply reflect governance attributes rather than how well the board is performing 
given those attributes.19 In order to provide some evidence as to whether the vote tallies reflect 
governance attributes, we rerun our analyses summarized in Tables 4 through 9 incorporating a 
number of governance variables in addition to the performance measures (RETt, RETt-1, RETt-2, 
ROAt, ROAt-1, ROAt-2, and CHG_INST_OWN): percentage of institutional ownership, number of 
blockholders, percentage of blockholders, G-score, board size, and percentage of board 
insiders.20  
 To ascertain whether the information content of the approval measures is captured by the 
combined performance and governance statistics, we re-run the analyses using the observations 
where data is available for all 13 performance and governance measures. Untabulated results 
indicate that despite the significant number of competing controls and limited sample sizes in 
several of our tests, the approval measures generally load in the predicted directions and retain 
their statistical significance.21 In fact, in a few cases, the results become even stronger. The few 
cases where the results are somewhat weaker are likely due to the combined effects of increasing 
                                                 
19 For example, shareholders might withhold votes from the board when the institutions of governance are deemed 
weak (e.g., too many inside directors) as opposed to when the board members are actually making poor decisions. 
Further, the extent of institutional holdings or number of blockholders, which are often viewed as governance 
attributes, could be an important driver of voting outcomes because these large shareholders are more likely to 
vote more diligently. 
20 We obtain the percentage of institutional ownership from Thompson Financial 13(f) institutional shareholder data. 
The number and percentage of blockholders are obtained from the Blockholders dataset on WRDS. The G-Score 
and percentage of board insider measures are obtained from Risk Metrics (IRRC) database. Board size is obtained 
from data provided by The Corporate Library. 
21 The results from this analysis are available upon request. 
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the number of dependent variables and significantly reducing already small sample sizes. Hence, 
the information content of the approval measures appears to be robust to a number of 
performance and governance variables, suggesting that the voting poll is not only a useful 
summary statistic, but also appears to reflect information not captured by a variety of 
performance and governance variables. 
7. Concluding comments 
 Many argue that uncontested director elections are meaningless because directors up for 
election almost surely prevail. We provide evidence, however, that vote tallies still play a 
meaningful role by reflecting investor perceptions of board performance. First, vote approval 
measures are related to other factors expected to reflect or influence investor perceptions of 
board performance. Second, the approval measures are associated with stock price behavior 
surrounding CEO turnover announcements in a manner consistent with those measures reflecting 
investor perceptions, even after controlling for other contemporaneously available performance 
and governance metrics. Finally, we provide evidence that vote tallies are associated with several 
future significant corporate events in a manner consistent with the vote outcomes reflecting 
board performance (i.e., CEO and board member retention, CEO compensation, divestitures, and 
acquisitions).  
 The results of our study suggest that uncontested director election outcomes can serve as a 
useful measure of board performance. At a minimum, board approval complements other 
standard performance measures. Our results also suggest that board approval measures can 
enrich governance studies by directly evaluating management, as opposed to examining the 
governance structures in place within the firm (e.g., board size or board independence).  
 Our findings are also applicable to recent proposals calling for majority voting in director 
elections. Our evidence suggests that while uncontested votes reflect investor perceptions of 
board performance, such proposals will have little effect unless they significantly alter voting 
behavior. An approval measure of 80% falls into the lowest quintile of our approval measures, 
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Standard & Poor's 500 as of January 1, 2000 2,500
   that are not utilities within SIC 4900-4999 2,290
   and that are not missing board approval data 1,795
   and that are not missing prior-year Compustat or CRSP data 1,660
   and that are not missing institutional holding-change data from Thomson Financial 1,564
   and that do not report dual CEOs 1,552
   and that are not subjects of vote no campaigns or proxy fights 1,512
   and that do not have dual class shares related to family owned shares 1,497
CEO Analysis
   and that have a CEO standing for election in the current year 827
Table 1
Sample Construction
The initial sample consists of the Standard & Poor's 500 list as of January 1, 2000, representing 2,500 firm-year
observations across the five years ended December 31, 2004. As described below, 1,003 observations are deleted
to focus the sample on non-utility firms, to obtain complete data, to avoid observations with dual CEOs, to avoid
observations subject to vote no campaigns or proxy fights, and to avoid observations with dual class shares related
to family owned shares. To enable analyses of CEO approval, an additional 670 observations are eliminated by
restricting the sample to those firms that have a CEO standing for election in the current year.
PANEL A - Board Approval


















2000 284 0.980 0.987 0.861 0.945 0.980 0.988 0.991 0.995 0.999 0.050 ***
2001 307 0.974 ** 0.986 * 0.827 0.924 ** 0.976 *** 0.986 *** 0.990 *** 0.994 0.997 0.070 ***
2002 318 0.970 0.983 *** 0.766 0.912 0.974 *** 0.982 *** 0.987 *** 0.992 *** 0.996 0.080 ***
2003 322 0.947 *** 0.967 *** 0.683 0.852 *** 0.949 *** 0.967 *** 0.978 *** 0.987 *** 0.997 0.135 ***
2004 266 0.947 0.970 0.710 0.854 0.953 *** 0.969 *** 0.975 *** 0.984 *** 1.000 0.130 ***
2000-2004 combined 1497 0.964 0.980 0.720 0.898 0.966 0.978 0.986 0.990 0.998 0.092 ***
PANEL B - CEO Approval


















2000 162 0.969 0.986 0.823 0.900 0.973 0.986 0.992 0.995 1.000 0.095 ***
2001 176 0.968 0.986 0.803 0.897 0.971 0.986 0.990 *** 0.995 0.999 0.098 ***
2002 174 0.962 0.984 * 0.757 0.873 * 0.971 0.983 *** 0.988 *** 0.993 *** 0.999 0.120 ***
2003 179 0.958 0.974 *** 0.743 0.886 0.962 *** 0.974 *** 0.980 *** 0.988 *** 0.995 0.102 ***
2004 136 0.953 0.970 0.660 0.870 0.960 ** 0.970 *** 0.980 0.993 *** 1.000 0.123 ***
2000-2004 combined 827 0.962 0.980 0.743 0.885 0.968 0.979 0.986 0.993 0.999 0.108 ***
Table 2
Distributional Statistics for Annual Board and CEO Approval 
BRD_APPR is the median ratio of "for" votes to total votes cast across board members standing for election within a firm-year. CEO_APPR  
is the ratio of "for" votes to total votes cast for the CEO standing for election within a firm-year. Panel A (Panel B) provides annual mean
and median BRD_APPR (CEO_APPR ) statistics. Means and medians for years 2001 through 2004 are compared with their respective
prior year means and medians using two-tail T and Wilcoxon tests, respectively. For the years 2001 to 2004, the means of each quintile are
compared with the respective prior year means using the two-tail T test. Means of the first and fifth quintiles are compared using the two-tail




CEO_APPR 0.906 *** 0.824 *** 0.720 *** 0.161 *** 0.115 *** 0.176 *** 0.139 *** 0.082 ** 0.058 * -0.011
QUINT_CEO_APPR 0.654 *** 0.707 *** 0.786 *** 0.119 *** 0.082 ** 0.123 *** 0.140 *** 0.092 *** 0.088 ** 0.011
BRD_APPR 0.797 *** 0.516 ***  0.841 *** 0.158 *** 0.197 *** 0.198 *** 0.176 *** 0.121 *** 0.083 *** -0.028
QUINT_BRD_APPR 0.524 *** 0.784 *** 0.590 ***  0.100 *** 0.125 *** 0.115 *** 0.160 *** 0.119 *** 0.098 *** 0.006
RET t 0.050 0.085 *** 0.035 0.078 ***  -0.101 *** 0.026 0.167 *** 0.042 0.008 0.207 ***
RET t-1 0.002 0.054 0.055 ** 0.084 *** -0.034 -0.025 0.268 *** 0.234 *** 0.104 *** -0.166 ***
RET t-2 0.065 * 0.081 ** 0.080 *** 0.096 *** -0.008 0.043 * 0.228 *** 0.237 *** 0.184 *** -0.055 **
ROA t 0.021 0.113 *** 0.084 *** 0.131 *** 0.088 *** 0.164 *** 0.129 ***  0.801 *** 0.687 *** -0.040
ROA t-1 -0.025 0.070 ** 0.053 ** 0.099 *** -0.034 0.129 *** 0.150 *** 0.784 *** 0.768 *** -0.070 ***
ROA t-2 -0.003 0.100 *** 0.044 * 0.082 *** -0.044 * 0.011 0.093 *** 0.678 *** 0.785 *** -0.026
CHG_INST_OWN -0.028 -0.019 -0.038 -0.003 0.171 *** -0.092 *** -0.009 -0.012 -0.058 ** -0.020
QUINT_ 
BRD_APPR




Pearson and Spearman Correlations Among Key Regression Variables
This table reports Pearson correlation coefficients in the lower-left and Spearman correlation coefficients in the upper-right. BRD _APPR (CEO_APPR ) is the median ratio of "for" votes to total votes cast across board
members (for the CEO) standing for election within a firm-year. QUINT_BRD_APPR (QUINT_CEO_APPR ) is the ranked quintile of BRD _APPR (CEO_APPR ). RET t is the industry-adjusted stock return for the 12
months preceding the annual shareholder meeting. RETt-1 is the industry-adjusted stock return for the period extending from 24 to 13 months preceding the annual shareholder meeting. RETt-2 is the industry-adjusted stock
return for the period extending from 36 to 25 months preceding the annual shareholder meeting. ROA t is the industry-adjusted return on assets for the four quarters preceding the annual shareholder meeting. ROAt-1 is the
industry-adjusted return on assets for the period extending from the eighth to the fifth quarter prior to the preceding annual shareholder meeting. ROAt-2 is the industry-adjusted return on assets for the period extending from
twelve to nine quarters preceding the annual shareholder meeting. CHG_INST_OWN is the percentage of shares held by institutions in the quarter immediately preceding the shareholder meeting minus the same statistic
one year earlier.  ***, **, and * indicate two-tail statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
QUINT_ 
CEO_APPR BRD_APPR
PANEL A - 5-day abnormal returns  (-3, +1) on approval measures
Hyp. sign Short model Long model Short model Long model  Short model Long model Short model Long model
Intercept 0.033 ** 0.031 ** 0.240 *** 0.240 ** 0.050 *** 0.044 ** 0.168 0.226 *
(2.25) (2.23) (2.77) (2.60) (2.79) (2.54) (1.60) (1.91) 
QUINT_BRD_APPR - -0.008 ** -0.006 *
(-1.67) (-1.51)
BRD_APPR - -0.216 *** -0.204 **
(-2.47) (-2.21)
QUINT_CEO_APPR - -0.014 ** -0.015 ***
(-2.18) (-2.57)
CEO_APPR - -0.150 * -0.210 **
(-1.29) (-1.74)
CONTROLS NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
R2 0.018 0.096 0.044 0.144 0.042 0.257 0.046 0.311
# of obs 167 167 167 167 82 82 82 82
PANEL B - 5-day abnormal returns (-3, +1) on approval measures and replacement CEO type 
Hyp. Sign  Short Model Long Model Short Model Long Model  Short Model Long Model Short Model Long Model
Intercept 0.038 0.031 0.354 *** 0.326 *** 0.092 ** 0.089 ** 0.339 ** 0.289
(1.38) (1.15) (2.90) (2.77) (2.32) (2.77) (2.21) (1.83) 
QUINT_BRD_APPR - -0.013 -0.005
(-1.20) (-0.69)
BRD_APPR - -0.344 *** -0.294 **
(-2.55) (-2.29)
QUINT_CEO_APPR - -0.038 ** -0.035 ***
(-2.25) (-3.24)
CEO_APPR - -0.354 ** -0.277 *
(-1.92) (-1.59)
INSIDER  ? -0.005 0.001 -0.211 -0.192 -0.062 -0.068 * -0.419 ** -0.199
(-0.17) (0.04) (-1.30) (-1.14) (-1.51) (-1.97) (-2.16) (1.02) 
APPR*INSIDER + 0.007 -0.001 0.231 * 0.198 0.033 ** 0.029 *** 0.463 ** 0.206
(0.54) (-0.07) (1.31) (1.10) (1.90) (2.44) (2.07) (0.97) 
CONTROLS NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES
R2 0.024 0.096 0.052 0.148 0.095 0.286 0.079 0.316
# of obs 167 167 167 167 82 82 82 82
# of insiders 116 116 116 116 56 56 56 56
Table 4
Approval and Abnormal Returns Surrounding CEO Turnover Announcements
This table reports coefficients and, in parentheses, t-statistics for OLS regression models that explain 5-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding CEO turnovers, both without
control variables (i.e., Short Model) and with control variables (i.e., Long Model). Panel A shows the results where the approval measure (APPR ) is QUINT_BRD_APPR
BRD_APPR , QUINT_CEO_APPR, or CEO_APPR . Panel B incorporates the effect of the replacement CEO type (i.e., insider or outsider). The CEO turnover announcement return,
CEO_CAR t+1, is the 5-day market model cumulative abnormal return estimated using CRSP-population data from a 255-day estimation period ending 46 days before the
announcement date. QUINT_BRD_APPR (QUINT_CEO_APPR ) is the quintile rank of BRD_APPR (CEO_APPR ) within each of the five years of the sample period. CONTROLS are
performance measures (i.e., RET t, RET t-1, RET t-2, ROA t, ROA t-1, ROA t-2, CHG_INST_OWN as previously defined in Table 3). INSIDER is one when the replacement CEO is an
insider and zero otherwise. We cluster by firm for all regressions and year fixed effects are included in the BRD_APPR  and CEO_APPR regressions. 
There are 167 turnovers examined in the board turnover analyses and only 82 in the CEO analyses, since not all of the 167 CEOs stood for election in the year before the turnover.
CEO turnovers are included if a CEO departure announcement occurs during the period beginning the day after the shareholder meeting and ending the day of the subsequent
shareholder meeting. 18 CEO turnovers were excluded from this analysis due to incomplete return data or because they were announced simultaneously with merger/acquisition
announcements. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in one-tail tests where the sign is predicted and in two-tail tests where the
sign is not predicted.
PANEL A: Predicting forced turnovers
Explanatory variable Hyp. sign
INTERCEPT -2.904 *** 3.350 -3.881 *** -2.622 * 5.065 -3.963 ***
(6.01) (2.08) (11.21) (2.75) (2.59) (7.33)
QUINT_BRD_APPR - -0.260 **
(5.34)
BRD_APPR - -6.442 ***
(9.69)
BQ1 + 0.853 ***
(8.28)
QUINT_CEO_APPR - -0.434 ***
(7.50)
CEO_APPR - -8.890 ***
(11.06)
CQ1 + 0.941 **
(4.65)
AGE  ? 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.010 0.017 0.009
(0.09) (0.05) (0.12) (0.14) (0.43) (0.12)
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES
Likelihood Ratio Chi Sq.Stat. 18.477 ** 33.505 *** 19.863 ** 19.923 ** 35.671 *** 16.456 *
Nagelkerke Psuedo R2 0.045 0.082 0.049 0.089 0.158 0.074
# of obs 1,497 1,497 1,497 827 827 827
PANEL B: Predicting forced turnovers with outsider replacement
Explanatory variable Hyp. sign
INTERCEPT -2.337 * 6.999 -4.005 *** -1.073 10.838 *** -3.124
(3.07) (6.15) (7.42) (0.31) (9.63) (2.34)
QUINT_BRD_APPR - -0.432 ***
(5.77)
BRD_APPR - -9.750 ***
(11.89)
BQ1 + 1.279 ***
(9.84)
QUINT_CEO_APPR - -0.670 **
(10.37)
CEO_APPR - -13.105 ***
(13.98)
CQ1 + 1.373 ***
(5.91)
AGE  ? -0.014 -0.018 -0.011 -0.028 -0.032 -0.028
(0.28) (0.47) (0.19) (0.64) (0.86) (0.62)
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES
Likelihood Ratio Chi Sq.Stat. 21.159 ** 31.139 *** 22.501 ** 19.032 ** 32.228 *** 15.961 *
Nagelkerke Psuedo R2 0.083 0.121 0.088 0.144 0.242 0.121
# of obs 1,497 1,497 1,497 827 827 827
Table 5
CEO Turnover
Prob. (1 = Forced Turnover) 
(Board approval)  
Prob. (1 = Forced Turnover) 
(CEO approval)  
Prob. (1 = Forced Turnover and Outside Replacement) 
(Board approval)  
Prob. (1 = Forced Turnover and Outside Replacement) 
(CEO approval)  
This table reports coefficients and, in parentheses, related Wald Chi-square statistics for binomial logistic regressions. In Panel A the dependent variable indicates zero for the
1,442 (797) firm-year observations cases indicating either no CEO turnover or an unforced turnover, and one for the 55 (30) forced CEO turnovers. In Panel B the dependent
variable indicates zero for the 1,469 (813) firm-year observations where there was no forced turnover with succession by an outsider and one for the 28 (14) with forced CEO
turnovers with outside succession. Each panel reports the results for three different test variables based upon both board and CEO approval. BRD_APPR (CEO_APPR ) is the
median ratio of "for" votes to total votes cast across board members standing for election (CEO up for election) within a firm-year. QUINT_APPR is the quintile rank of APPR 
from lowest to highest within each of the five years of the sample period. BQ1 (CQ1 ) equals 1 if the board (CEO) approval measure falls within the lowest quintile of APPR 
during the respective year, and 0 otherwise. AGE is the CEO's age at the shareholder meeting date. CONTROLS are performance measures (i.e., RET t, RET t-1, RET t-2, ROA t, 
ROA t-1, ROA t-2, CHG_INST_OWN as previously defined in Table 3). We cluster by firm for all regressions and year fixed effects are included in the non-quintiled regressions.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively, in one-tail tests where the sign is predicted and in two-tail tests where the sign is not
predicted.
Explanatory variable Hyp. sign
INTERCEPT 0.305 *** 0.664 *** 0.228 *** 0.289 *** 0.597 *** 0.223 ***
( 15.09) ( 3.78) ( 21.98) ( 14.75) ( 3.29) ( 21.73) 
  QUINT_BRD_APPR - -0.023 *** -0.022 ***
(-4.32) (-4.02)
  BRD_APPR - -0.378 ** -0.331 **
(-2.15) (-1.81)
  BQ1 + 0.056 *** 0.044 **
( 2.48) ( 1.98) 
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.023 0.025 0.016 0.024 0.023 0.017
# of obs 1,471 1,471 1,471 1,420 1,420 1,420
BRD_TURN 
(including CEO turnovers with outside successions)
BRD_TURN 
(excluding CEO turnovers with outside successions)
This table reports coefficients and, in parentheses, t-statistics for OLS regression models that explain director turnover, BRD_TURN, for the full sample of
firms where director turnover is available and for a subsample that excludes CEO turnovers with outside successions. BRD_TURN is director turnover
divided by the total number of board members standing for election. BRD_APPR is the median ratio of "for" votes to total votes cast across board members
standing for election within a firm-year. QUINT_BRD_ APPR is the quintile rank of BRD_APPR within each of the five years of the sample period. BQ1
equals 1 if the board approval measure falls within the lowest quintile of APPR during the respective year, and 0 otherwise. CONTROLS are performance
measures (i.e., RET t, RET t-1, RET t-2, ROA t, ROA t-1, ROA t-2, CHG_INST_OWN as previously defined in Table 3). We cluster by firm for all regressions, and
year fixed effects are included in the non-quintiled regressions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in
one-tail tests where the sign is predicted and in two-tail tests where the sign is not predicted.
Table 6
Director Turnover 
Explanatory variable Hyp. sign
INTERCEPT -0.503 -11.551 1.201 -1.219 -38.478 *** 2.209 **
(-0.54) ( 0.90) ( 1.58) (-1.02) (-2.90) ( 2.34) 




BQ1 - -1.959 **
(-1.71)
QUINT_CEO_APPR + 0.903 **
( 2.32) 
CEO_APPR + 42.319 ***
( 2.88) 
CQ1 - -3.757 ***
(-2.85)
CONTRACT ? -0.346 -17.184 1.397 2.619 31.149 0.074
(-0.21) (-0.50) (1.04) (1.12) (1.38) (0.05) 
APPR*CONTRACT  - / - / + 0.548 18.796 -1.193 -0.594 -31.298 * 3.205
(0.88) (0.53) (-0.50) (-0.86) (-1.33) (1.25) 
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES
R2 0.024 0.096 0.052 0.048 0.063 0.049
# of obs 330 330 330 203 203 203
# of contracts 124 124 124 79 79 79
Table 7
Excess CEO Compensation 
CEO Excess Compensation 
(Board Approval Measures)
CEO Excess Compensation 
(CEO Approval Measures)
This table reports coefficients and, in parentheses, t-statistics for OLS regression models that explain CEO excess compensation (in millions) during the first full fiscal year
following an annual meeting. Excess compensation is estimated using the approach employed by Core, Guay, and Larcker (2008). The first three columns show results for
models that contain board approval test variables and the second three columns show results for models that contain CEO approval test variables. BRD_APPR (CEO_APPR ) 
is the median ratio of "for" votes to total votes cast across board members standing for election (CEO standing for election) within a firm-year. QUINT_BRD(CEO)_APPR is the
quintile rank of BRD(CEO)_APPR from lowest to highest within each of the five years of the sample period. BQ1 (CQ1 ) equals 1 if the board (CEO) approval measure falls
within the lowest quintile of APPR during the respective year, and 0 otherwise. CONTROLS are performance measures (i.e., RET t, RET t-1, RET t-2, ROA t, ROA t-1, ROA t-2, 
CHG_INST_OWN, as previously defined in Table 3). CONTRACT takes the value of one if the CEO has an explicit employment agreement and zero otherwise. We cluster by
firm for all regressions and year fixed effects are included in the non-quintiled regressions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,






INTERCEPT 0.012 * 0.085 ** 0.000 - - - 
( 1.89) ( 2.00) (-0.05)
  QUINT_BRD_APPR - -0.004 ** + 0.061 **
(-2.04) ( 2.13) 
  BRD_APPR - -0.085 ** + 1.062
(-1.99) ( 0.62) 
  BQ1 + 0.010 * - -0.250 **
( 1.62) ( 2.77) 
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES
R² 0.024 0.023 0.016
Nagelkerke Psuedo R2 0.031 0.040 0.032
Likelihood Ratio Chi Sq.Stat. 40.477 *** 51.640 *** 41.101 ***




The first three columns below report coefficients and, in parentheses, t-statistics for OLS regression models that explain cumulative 5-day returns
surrounding acquisition announcements, ACQ_CAR . The second three columns report coefficients and, in parentheses, Wald Chi-Squared statistics for
ordered logistic regression models that explain the number of acquisition announcements in the 12 months subsequent to the annual meeting,
ACQ_FREQ . ACQ_CAR is estimated using CRSP-population data from a 255-day estimation period ending 46 days before the acquisition
announcement for all acquisition announcements that took place in the 12 months subsequent to the annual meeting. ACQ_FREQ is the number of
acquisitions that take place in the 12 months subsequent to the annual meeting. BRD_APPR is the median ratio of "for" votes to total votes cast across
board members standing for election within a firm-year. QUINT_BRD_ APPR is the quintile rank of BRD_APPR within each of the five years of the
sample period. BQ1 equals 1 if the board approval measure falls within the lowest quintile of APPR during the respective year, and 0 otherwise.
CONTROLS are performance measures (i.e., RET t, RET t-1, RET t-2, ROA t, ROA t-1, ROA t-2, CHG_INST_OWN as previously defined in Table 3). We
cluster by firm for all regressions and year fixed effects are included in non-quintiled regressions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%,






INTERCEPT 0.021 0.132 -0.001 - - - 
( 2.22) ( 2.90) (-0.22)
  QUINT_BRD_APPR - -0.006 *** - -0.099 **
(-2.41) ( 3.34) 
  BRD_APPR - -0.119 *** - -1.974 *
(-2.70) ( 1.55) 
  BQ1 + 0.021 *** + 0.299 **
( 2.45) ( 3.00) 
CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES YES
R² 0.046 0.032 0.043
Nagelkerke Psuedo R2 0.026 0.026 0.025
Likelihood Ratio Chi Sq.Stat. 28.745 *** 28.061 *** 27.932 ***
# of obs 275 275 275 1497 1497 1497
DIV_CAR DIV_FREQ
The first three columns report coefficients and, in parentheses, t-statistics for OLS regression models that explain 5-day cumulative abnormal returns surrounding
divestiture announcements, DIV_CAR . The second three columns report coefficients and, in parentheses, Wald Chi-Squared statistics for ordered logistic regression
models that explain the number of divestiture announcements in the 12 months following the annual meeting, DIV_FREQ . DIV_CAR is estimated using CRSP-
population data from a 255-day estimation period ending 46 days before the divestiture announcement for all divestiture announcement dates that took place in the 12
months subsequent to the annual meeting. BRD_APPR is the median ratio of "for" votes to total votes cast across board members standing for election within a firm-
year. QUINT_BRD_ APPR is the quintile rank of BRD_APPR within each of the five years of the sample period. BQ1 equals 1 if the board approval measure falls
within the lowest quintile of APPR during the respective year, and 0 otherwise. CONTROLS are performance measures (i.e., RET t, RET t-1, RET t-2, ROA t, ROA t-1 , 
ROA t-2, CHG_INST_OWN as previously defined in Table 3). We cluster by firm for all regressions and year fixed effects are included in the non-quintiled regressions.
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, in one-tail tests where the sign is predicted and in two-tail tests where the sign
is not predicted.
Table 9 
Divestiture  Activity
